Syrian Repatriation: Too Soon to Be a Reality?
Beyza Yildirim, Research Intern, Institute for Migration Studies, Lebanese American University
The Syrian refugee crisis began in 2011 following the Syrian government’s violent crackdown on popular demonstrations at the outset of the Arab Spring. Since then, more than 70% of Syria’s population has come to rely on humanitarian assistance and millions have been forced to flee their homes. Today, Syrian refugees are dispersed across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, with Türkiye hosting the largest number—approximately 3 million (there are varying estimates between 2.8 and 3.5 million).
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the formation of a transitional government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the question of Syrian repatriation has reemerged at the center of regional political discourse. This conversation is particularly urgent in Türkiye, where public resentment toward Syrian refugees has grown markedly in recent years. In response, thousands of Syrians have returned to Syria—many without oversight from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Under Turkish law, a voluntary return must be verified by either UNHCR or another non-governmental organization. Yet, of the 503,000 returns recorded in 2022, only around 125,000 were verified as voluntary by the UNHCR. The forced or coerced return of refugees violates international law, specifically the 1951 Refugee Convention, which states that repatriation is only permissible when the conditions causing displacement have undergone a “fundamental and durable” change. The UNHCR maintains that decisions to return must be made freely, based on accurate information, and with full consideration of the risks. Protections granted to Syrian refugees must therefore remain in place until conditions in Syria allow for a truly safe and dignified return.
It is crucial that the repatriation process not be rushed. Post-conflict repatriation often takes decades. In Côte d’Ivoire, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, it took ten to twenty years before return became viable. For example, some Ivoirians displaced in 2002 were only able to return in 2022. These precedents highlight the lengthy process required to rebuild war-torn societies and offer valuable insight into what Syria’s own recovery may require.
Despite pressure to repatriate, many Syrians remain reluctant to return due to ongoing insecurity and the lack of viable living conditions. Homes and schools have been destroyed, essential infrastructure remains damaged, and employment opportunities are scarce. The UNHCR recommends “go-and-see” visits, allowing refugees to assess the situation in their hometowns firsthand. Studies indicate that refugees’ decisions to return are influenced more by conditions inside Syria than by policies in host countries. Importantly, these visits may also result in decisions not to return—choices that must be respected.
Türkiye, while grappling with domestic pressures, must continue to support the transitional government and broader recovery efforts in Syria. Years of conflict and authoritarian rule have devastated Syria’s social and physical infrastructure: 23 percent of residential buildings have been destroyed, only about half of hospitals are operational, and the education system is in disrepair. Long-term investment in Syria’s reconstruction will serve the interests of both Syrians and the wider region. A stable, secure Syria would not only increase the viability of return but also reduce future displacement pressures on neighboring countries.
While several thousand Syrians have already left Türkiye, it is vital to acknowledge that Syria has had only a few months to begin rebuilding after more than a decade of devastation under Assad’s rule. The country remains far from ready to ensure a safe, voluntary, and dignified return for its displaced population. Though Turkish society may be growing impatient, a responsible approach to repatriation demands patience. Without meaningful improvements in Syria’s conditions, pushing for return risks deepening vulnerability, undermining recovery, and violating core principles of international protection.