De Facto Resilience as the New Normal

April 24, 2025

Josiane Matar, Rhodes Scholar, DPhil Candidate in Migration Studies, University of Oxford; Visiting Fellow, Institute for Migration Studies, Lebanese American University

Both Lebanese citizens and refugees have realized that the government has failed them by not being able to implement economic reforms to manage the ongoing crisis. This situation has left them with two choices: either accepting the prevailing status quo or actively seeking ways to navigate the challenging circumstances and secure their livelihoods. Considering these dynamics, this paper presents the concept of “de facto resilience,” where resilience becomes an established or inevitable reality that shapes the livelihoods of both the refugees and the host population. Despite the resilience-oriented rhetoric and policy objectives among international donors, resilience has evolved naturally or unavoidably due to ongoing situations rather than being intentionally planned or implemented.

In the absence of a clear crisis response framework, both refugees and hosts relied on their own agency as the essential strategy for survival and maintaining their livelihoods. De facto resilience became the only option available to navigate the crisis in the absence of state support. Hence, this concept presents a nuanced understanding of how resilience interacts with the social and spatial experiences of migrants and hosts in the context of ambiguity and multiple crises.

Resilience is often defined as “the ability of an individual, a community, or a country to cope, adapt, and recover quickly from stress and shocks caused by a disaster, violence, or conflict”. The key terms here are “recover” and “quickly,” which we can realize neither fits nor matches the Lebanese context. Hence, framing survival as resilience has become a common narrative in Lebanon. It represents a mere end for livelihood and survival in the current context and does not necessarily reflect a sustainable solution.

Resilience in the Context of Ambiguity and Hybrid Governance

The Lebanese state initially responded to the refugee influx with a ‘policy of no policy’ and strategic indifference, exacerbating challenges in managing the crisis, particularly amid subsequent setbacks such as the economic downturn, heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut Port explosion in August 2020.

This initial state of denial transformed into an undeniable reality, resulting in a vicious circle of divisions among policy makers characterized by arbitrary policy responses and ad-hoc measures that only worsened the situation. The economic crisis further complicated an already strained system, characterized by weak infrastructure, ineffective social policies, and mismanagement of public goods, significantly impacting both Lebanese and Syrians. This shared experience of uncertainty and loss minimised the division between refugees and hosts in some cases, reshaping the perception of otherness that previously dictated their interaction.

Since 2014, efforts by international organizations, local administrations, and civil society groups have primarily underpinned Lebanon’s resilience in this crisis. However, in the face of escalating crises and funding shortages, the community’s ability to manage the situation ceased to rely solely on external support from donors or collaboration with local entities. Instead, resilience became evident in the day-to-day interactions and initiatives. The increased mutual vulnerability prompted refugees and hosts to adopt a personal and proactive pursuit of resilience as a survival strategy.

Through these survival mechanisms, a new form of resilience has emerged, not facilitated by state or international organizational support, but rather shaped by their absence or inefficiency. In this regard, the power of resilience has been portrayed through the agency of both the refugees and the hosts. They are seen as solely responsible for their own situations, regardless of the role and responsibility of the state or other regional or international actors.

Resilience in this context can be framed as a flexible idea shaped by the interactions between diverse actors and emerging socio-political dynamics. Hence, resilience in a context of ambiguity and restrictive policy environment is manifested on a local and individual level beyond the scope of the state or the macro national scale. It is not isolated to one group’s capacity to withstand adversity but is intricately linked to their shared vulnerabilities, dependencies, and interactions amid hardships.

As the crisis exacerbated, the gap created by the lack of policy and institutional ambiguity produced a new reconfiguration of the socio-economic make-up of the crisis setting and the interaction between the host and refugee community. Hence, resilience in practice has been depicted through various channels:

Resilience through an Infrastructure of Care

In times of overlapping crises, individuals intentionally mobilize their social networks to foster both individual and collective well-being and security amidst hardship, which came to be known as “resilience within networked communities”. Contrary to popular belief, among both the Syrian and Lebanese communities, acts of solidarity became more significant as situations of hardship and vulnerability brought people together. During this period, there was a notable surge in solidarity both within and between communities. This was demonstrated by the exchange of money, goods, and services within informal social networks, leading to the establishment of distinct support systems by both groups to navigate the impact of the crisis.

At a time when economic and political elites are widely seen as the instigators of the crisis and viewed with deep suspicion, people resorted to supporting one another in acquiring necessities. This economy of belonging and sharing shows that ‘horizontal’ interactions play a crucial role in helping people get by the daily struggles to ensure their livelihood. Despite not necessarily providing financial support, people came together to provide emotional support, communicate their concerns and openly share with one another. The social ties that connect the Lebanese people together created a safety net and space for them to adapt to the harsh conditions by showing care and emotional support. Interestingly, within both the refugee and Lebanese communities, interactions, particularly among women, helped in navigating the crisis. This included discussions over cups of coffee, exchanging ideas on budget planning, childcare, and sharing affordable meal options. Resilience in this regard was empowered through the social bonds and care that existed between people and were embedded in the historical and cultural aspects of the country.

Resilience through Local Governance and Political Dynamics

In addition to the lack of a national policy to respond to the refuge influx, the absence of willingness from the state to implement economic reforms, allowed local entities like municipalities, faith-based organizations, and political parties to replace the role of the state and provide services to the locals while managing the situation on the ground. Local governments became even more central in the life of citizens and residents in Lebanon at times where policy- making at the central level is crippled by political deadlocks and inability to fulfil obligations. Notably, municipalities that exhibited resilience in facing these crises demonstrated a robust social structure reinforced through individual efforts, initiative, and leadership of mayors and council members. In cases where there were no social tensions between the refugees and the hosts, municipalities took a leading role in promoting coexistence and maintaining peace and harmony between both communities.

In addition to municipalities, faith-based organizations and political parties played pivotal roles in service distribution. The sectarian nature of the Lebanese state established a clientelist network that served as a shield against socio-economic and political marginality for members of a certain sect or those showing allegiance to a certain political party. Local patronage networks provided safety and services not only to citizens but also to refugees who became integrated into Lebanon’s pervading clientelist and patronage system. In this context, resilience was not manifested equally across the country. Notably, resilience varied across regions, resulting in inequalities as towns under specific political or sectarian dominance had more agency and resource allocation. While these practices secured basic needs, they often perpetuated unequal resource access and reinforced existing power structures, hindering broader societal resilience. For instance, many political actors have leveraged this state of precarity to foster new allegiances and regain popularity by creating dependency among the local population through their service provision. While this may seem like a short-term survival mechanism, it fosters resentment within the community, which is likely to intensify the longer the crisis persists.

Resilience through Humanitarian and Financial Assistance

The resilience of the current system hinges on diverse funding channels. International donors have allocated billions in aid to the Lebanese government to support Syrian refugees in exchange for their continued presence within its territories. The presence of refugees provided a leeway to the Lebanese government to leverage this situation to ensure increased funding from Western donors, commonly referred to as ‘refugee rentierism’. By shifting the burden of refugees to third parties, such as UNHCR, the government has managed to mitigate the consequences of a lack of cohesive policy and has become heavily reliant on foreign assistance. In a previous ISJCR commentary, Lama Mourad described Lebanon’s resilience, attributing it to the reliance on external funding, emphasizing a greater dependency on international aid over state policies. For instance, many municipalities reported an increase in reliance on international organizations for assistance to cover their most basic expenses and compensate for the absence of public resources.

As new crises emerged and conditions worsened, the gap between aid requirements and available funds increased, which led to a shift in the sources and reasons for funding. In Lebanon, the diaspora emerged as a key humanitarian actor capable of delivering financial and humanitarian assistance through donations to municipalities and sending remittances to their families living in Lebanon. Since 2019, there has been a substantial increase in humanitarian aid from the Lebanese residing abroad, addressing diverse needs like food distribution, sanitation, and medical support. These remittances established an alternative funding stream beyond traditional humanitarian organizations and international donors, effectively reaching remote areas and the country’s poorest and most forgotten groups. Furthermore, resettled refugees in third countries contributed to aiding their relatives and friends in Lebanon through remittance channels, having achieved stability and integration themselves.

Resilience through Informal Economies and Adaptive Mechanisms

The exclusion of refugees from government policy planning and limited integration in the job market often leaves them with no choice but to accept their status or turn to illegal means for livelihoods. Despite these challenges, refugees have shown remarkable resilience, even prior to 2019, by adapting within the informal economy, benefitting both themselves and the host community. However, the economic crisis exacerbated vulnerabilities for both refugees and Lebanese hosts, worsening an already dire situation. Yet, amidst this adversity, practical engagements in adaptation, welfare, and survival activities have fostered a sense of cohesion and informal integration in certain areas, countering the prevalent discourse of hostility towards Syrian refugees and accusations of their role in aggravating the economic crisis.

As a response to decreased humanitarian assistance and inadequate state services, private-public partnerships with refugees and the Lebanese hosts and informal activities across the Lebanese-Syrian borders emerged as a means to sustain livelihoods. In certain instances, micro-business ventures and joint entrepreneurial activities facilitated coexistence between both communities. Lebanese shop owners found that handing their businesses to Syrians, buying goods from Syria or renting their shops out as a more profitable investment than running them themselves. Syrians’ contributions in the agriculture and construction sectors, offering essential services like waste management and plumbing, further integrated them within the local community. Consequently, Syrians gradually became ‘abstractly embedded’ within the local community due to shared vulnerabilities, fostering a sense of interdependence based on mutual need.

Despite occurring in informal settings where many Syrians are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, these interactions often exhibit resilience. They enable refugees to secure basic needs and livelihoods while also integrating Syrian refugees into the adaptive strategies of Lebanese hosts. As a result, informal adaptive measures have been employed to compensate for the state’s inability to implement reform initiatives and to assist refugees in navigating the constraints imposed by legal structures.

In this case, resilience isn’t exclusively characterized by positive attributes or the ability to rebound from adversity; instead, it often emerges as the primary means to secure basic needs, even within settings marked by exploitation and informality. It represents the capacity to endure and adapt in challenging circumstances, even when the strategies employed are unfavourable or exploitative.

Resilience as Adaptation, Not a Permanent Solution

The concept of de facto resilience might give the impression that individuals can independently adapt and endure challenges, suggesting self-sufficiency without relying on state support. However, celebrating this resilience might inadvertently divert attention from the state’s duties and normalize the vulnerabilities experienced by both the refugees and hosts.

The literature often defines resilience as the ability to absorb and navigate challenging situations and crises, occasionally offering an overly optimistic view of crisis responses. However, resilience doesn’t necessarily guarantee an escape from precarious circumstances. In the absence of comprehensive solutions from governing bodies, de facto resilience becomes the default strategy for individuals or communities to navigate difficult situations. It prevails, especially among those sharing similar vulnerabilities and circumstances. The power of resilience in this regard lies in its flexibility and ability to be manifested differently across time and space.

While resilience became the only choice for communities confronting challenges, it’s essential not to solely attribute it as the ultimate solution for their survival. In reality, these mechanisms may not align with conventional notions of resilience but can represent an adaptation to precarity and the status quo, serving as the sole means for survival without providing an effective roadmap to address the crisis. Despite resilience being manifested across various aspects of the Lebanese environment, the reality on the ground has remained disconnected from a protective environment and an improvement of the political and socio-economic conditions.

Moreover, while resilience has been portrayed as a means to promote self-reliance, it has not resulted in integration or established a solution or policy framework for managing refugees or addressing the crisis effectively. The discourse on resilience often serves the interest of donors and the state by shifting the burden of coping with the crisis onto the victims, rather than proactively addressing the underlying sources of tension through policy-oriented approaches. Presenting adaptation as resilience actively deflects responsibility from the state, placing undue pressure on individuals and communities and inadvertently holding them accountable for their vulnerability.

Adapting doesn’t necessarily offer a way out of the crisis, leaving both refugees and hosts in precarious situations, entangled in a time-space trap. For instance, those who are relying on informal mechanisms to ensure their survival are constantly confined or limited within a vicious cycle. The persistence of the crisis and the lack of long-term stability hinder the ability of both refugees and hosts to address their needs adequately, preventing them from securing stable livelihoods and planning for the future.

Despite taking personal initiatives, both refugees and hosts remain dependent on state policies and the prevailing political and economic circumstances. Emphasizing survival without prospects for substantial change or improvement in these conditions might undermine collective aspirations to find a clear path out of their current hardships.

Final Reflections

By establishing de facto resilience, the system of informality risks becoming the new norm, potentially undermining efforts to establish a political framework that secures the safe and dignified return of the refugee population. Over time, these survival mechanisms become ingrained and accepted as the standard way of navigating challenges, even if they do not necessarily indicate long-term integration or a desire for refugees to remain in the host country. Therefore, the discourse on resilience should not obscure the role of the state and policymakers in instituting reforms and taking proactive measures to address the crisis.

The current livelihood strategies presented in this paper have emerged in a highly formalized yet unstructured and fragmented environment. While de facto resilience may initially serve as an immediate response to desperation and foster short-term unity, its prolonged application could potentially unravel the fabric holding both Lebanese and Syrian communities together. Though resilience helps confront immediate challenges, its prolonged use without structural changes could normalize vulnerabilities and precarity among the affected population.

The acceptance of informality as the standard crisis response might impede the establishment of a structured political framework necessary for the safe and dignified return of refugees. Rather than viewing resilience solely as a tool to alleviate social tensions, governments should harness these emerging informal structures between hosts and refugees to foster negotiation and cooperation. Such an approach empowers refugees and hosts alike, ensuring their active involvement in plans for return and recovery.

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