Resilience, Return, and Inclusive Governance in Post-Assad Syria
Abbas Ismail, PhD Candidate and Integrated Researcher, Centre for International Studies, ISCTE, University Institute of Lisbon; Visiting Fellow, Institute for Migration Studies, Lebanese American University
The fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 was a turning point in Syria’s long and devastating conflict. As the country embarks on a new chapter, the transition depends on political negotiations and the success of building inclusive governance structures that foster resilience and national unity. While more and more attention is being paid to power sharing, decentralization, and gender inclusion, one crucial dimension remains underexposed: the return and reintegration of millions of displaced Syrians.
More than one million Syrians have returned spontaneously since the end of 2024, including more than 300,000 from neighboring countries and almost 900,000 internally displaced persons. As the intention to return increases across the region, return is no longer a hypothetical scenario but a rapidly evolving reality that requires urgent policy responses. Government institutions must not only be able to deal with diversity but also to integrate displaced persons who have long been excluded from political and economic life.
This paper argues that return must be a key element of inclusive governance and resilience in post-Assad Syria. It examines how reintegration is linked to political inclusion, gender equality, external engagement, and local governance. Without policies to protect the rights, ensure participation, and support the equality of returnees, Syria risks repeating the exclusionary patterns that led to the conflict.
Inclusive Governance and Political Exclusion
Inclusion is not just a political ideal in the Syrian transition process but a fundamental requirement for resilience. Resilience in this context refers to the ability of Syrian society to recover from conflict, adapt to challenges, and promote long-term stability. However, exclusion feeds fragmentation, deepens grievances, and undermines peacebuilding efforts. True inclusivity needs more than symbolic representation; it requires real influence on decision-making in governance structures.
The recent agreement between the Syrian interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) shows progress toward integration. Yet, the SDF’s continued military and administrative autonomy raises concerns about parallel governance structures and further fragmentation. While the inclusion is significant, other vital groups remain excluded. Former opposition groups, displaced communities, civil society actors, and women’s organizations continue to be sidelined, weakening the Legitimacy and sustainability of transition. If governance structures do not reflect all voices, Syria’s rebuilding will be fragile and driven by power struggles rather than meaningful inclusion, weakening long-term resilience.
Among those most affected are the returnees, confronted with institutional and legal exclusion after years of displacement. Many face difficulties in reclaiming their property, gaining access to documents, or participating in politics, especially those who are considered opposition supporters. For example, decree-Law 10 (2018) has facilitated the confiscation of land without proper procedure. In addition, the lack of legal identity documents prevents access to services, education, and voting rights, especially for women and stateless groups.
Reintegration must go beyond physical return and include legal protection, access to services, and political participation, especially at the local level, where their engagement can help restore trust and strengthen community cohesion. The Word Bank defines inclusion as:
This vision must be institutionalized through policies that embed inclusion into governance structures to ensure power-sharing reflects Syria’s entire social and political diversity.
Both UNSCR 2254 (2015) and the Geneva Communiqué (2012) emphasized the need for an inclusive Syrian-led process, but their incomplete implementation during the peace process added to fragmentation. The transitional government must create a comprehensive power-sharing framework prioritizing marginalized groups, including displaced persons, women, and civil society. Otherwise, resilience will remain fragile, and governance structures will reproduce existing inequalities.
The Framework for Peaceful Pathways underlines that sustainable peace requires long-term governance reforms beyond short-term security measures. In Syria, this means creating inclusive structures that accommodate returnees and marginalized communities. Without meaningful inclusion, exclusion will continue to fuel mistrust and instability. Resilience depends on empowering all parts of society, not just the political elite, to shape the country’s future.
Gendered Dimensions of Return: Reintegration and Representation
Syria’s transition offers a rare opportunity to encourage gender inclusion beyond symbolic gestures. For decades, women’s rights in Syria were largely symbolic, and the legal framework allowed for only minimal actual empowerment. Without targeted reforms, there is a risk that the post-Assad phase will return to elite-driven governance that excludes women from playing a significant role.The conflict has had a disproportionate impact on women, exacerbating economic hardship, gender-based violence, and legal discrimination. Although some have been appointed to high-level positions, these steps are insufficient without institutional reform. According to the UN World Public Sector Report (2019), a gender-equitable governance framework requires the following:
- Institutionalizing gender quotas in decision-making bodies
- Reforming discriminatory laws that limit women’s rights
- Empowering women-led civil society organizations to influence policies
Despite the call for inclusion in the National Dialogue Conference in February 2025, the 30% quota was not achieved, which indicates persistent structural obstacles. Women are not only victims; they are also crucial for rebuilding resilient communities. Their exclusion weakens social recovery, governance legitimacy, and community cohesion.
Women face particular challenges in reclaiming property, obtaining documentation, and accessing protection. Patriarchal norms and legal barriers continue to restrict their rights, particularly concerning land inheritance and civil registration. Political reintegration is similarly tricky: returning women are often excluded from decision-making despite having held a leadership role abroad.
Inclusive governance must ensure that returning women can fully participate in public life. This requires not only gender quotas but policies that protect rights, secure access to services, and empower women’s voices in shaping Syria’s future. Gender-inclusive reintegration is an essential prerequisite for resilience and sustainable peace.
External Actors and Return
With Assad’s departure, external actors are redefining their roles in Syria’s future. However, their engagement remains fragmented, with competing interests often reinforcing divisions rather than promoting cohesion. The Gulf Cooperation Council states are now prioritizing governance support and economic partnerships, while Türkiye concentrates on countering Kurdish autonomy. Western actors face a strategic dilemma: supporting governance without exacerbating factionalism.
These dynamics raise a crucial question: Is international support strengthening resilience or aggravating political fragmentation? In the past, many external actors prioritized state stability over social integration and supported centralist institutions while marginalizing the voices of the opposition and civil society. This approach undermined long-term peace since large sections of the population were excluded from governance.
International engagement must also address the realities of refugee return. Over 14 million Syrians were displaced, but the conditions for safe and voluntary return are unequal. Selective, politically motivated returns risk deepening divisions. For example, Türkiye’s resettlement policy in the majority of Kurdish areas or the Syrian regime’s reluctance to accept former opposition supporters could cause new tensions.
Returnees frequently lack legal protection and face property confiscation and political exclusion. Western donors hesitate to support returns without guarantees of rights, justice, and security. Humanitarian aid alone is insufficient; it must be combined with governance reforms promoting reintegration and inclusion. In this context, resilience and inclusion are inseparable: A truly resilient society can only arise if all groups are represented, grievances are addressed, and governance truly reflects the diversity of the Syrian population.
While external support can have a constructive role, it must go beyond security-oriented interventions and focus on building governance capacities that enable local structures to function within a broader national framework. This means moving away from short-term stabilization efforts and investing in long-term institution-building. This includes supporting inclusive local governance, ensuring the rights of returnees, and promoting coordination between local and national actors. Fragmented support risks recreating the fractures that fueled the Syrian conflict. Instead, return and reintegration must be central pillars of any external strategy for resilience.
Local Governance and Return
Local governance has played an important role in Syria’s transition by providing basic services, mediating disputes, and responding to community needs. Models such as local councils and self-administration have filled gaps in governance and demonstrated their potential to support a more inclusive national framework. However, these structures are still fragmented and influenced by political affiliations, foreign influence, and regional security dynamics.
This challenge has become even more urgent recently, given recent trends. Since December 2024, more than one million Syrians have returned spontaneously, including almost 900,000 internally displaced persons and over 300,000 refugees from neighboring countries such as Türkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan. As the spontaneous return is expected to continue in 2025, local governance structures will be the first to take up the pressure of reintegration.
Therefore, as the main point of contact for returnees, local authorities are crucial for reintegration. However, many cannot organize returns process properly. Inconsistent practices, political partiality, and limited resources are leading to exclusion, especially for people from opposition regions or marginalized groups.
Therefore, the recent agreement between the interim government and the SDF gives hope for greater national unity. Still, its sustainability is uncertain. As returns progress, the need for a unified legal and institutional framework becomes even more urgent. Without this, local governance can reinforce parallel power structures and deepen regional inequalities instead of promoting national integration.
Again, returnees often face the challenge of reclaiming their property, obtaining documents, and gaining access to services. These problems risk undermining trust and deepening social divides without a coordinated framework. Ad hoc or discriminatory reintegration practices can reinforce the dominance of elites and deepen instability.
To serve as a driver of resilience, local governance must be integrated into a national strategy that ensures inclusivity, legal clarity, and equitable distribution of resources. This includes standard property claims and civil documentation procedures, returnee advocacy, and support for locally-led reintegration efforts. The institutionalization of inclusive local governance is crucial to transforming the return from a source of tension into an opportunity for a national renaissance.
Conclusion: Reintegration as a Test of Resilience
The prospects for peace and stability in Syria as it enters the post-Assad era depend not only on ending the violence, but also on rebuilding the country inclusively. This paper argues that inclusive governance must go beyond formal power-sharing to address the reintegration of millions of displaced Syrians. This process is already underway on a large scale. With more than one million returnees since the end of 2024 and further returnees expected in 2025, return is no longer a distant political question but a current and urgent governance challenge.
Returnees face considerable obstacles when reclaiming their property, obtaining documents, and participating in political life again. Women, especially, are confronted with structural inequalities that threaten to deprive them of the autonomy they exercised in exile. If these exclusions are not addressed, previous patterns of marginalization will be repeated, undermining any sense of resilience or Legitimacy in the new Syrian state.
From local councils to national institutions, inclusive governance must institutionalize mechanisms that guarantee the rights and participation of returnees. External actors also carry responsibility: Fragmented aid and short-term stabilization attempts must give way to long-term support for reintegration and institution-building. Reintegration is not a peripheral topic: It is a litmus test of whether Syria can move from fragmentation to unity and survival to resilience.