The Legacy of the Post-War Socio-Political Arrangement: Difference and Inequality in Lebanon
Jad Malass, Visiting Research Fellow, Institute for Migration Studies, Lebanese American University
Introduction
The 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Lebanese War (1975-1990) brought back to the forefront debates about pre-war dynamics and the post-war consequences of a deadly conflict that saw internal bloodshed and international rivalries played out at the expense of a nation in early formation. In the post-war academic literature, namely in political science, international affairs, and political economy, attempts to analyze the post-war system have heavily focused on the state of the local sectarian distribution of power, the geopolitical dynamics underpinning the state of the status quo, and the structural woes of corruption, clientelism, and the mismanagement of public resources. The purpose behind this commentary is not to support nor refute these debates.
In her discussion on the political economy of sectarianism in Lebanon, Lebanese sociologist Rima Majed points out how there has been “a decline in sociological analyses that engage with the question of social structures and social cleavages and attempt to study, rather than assume, the nature of social conflict”. Building on Majed’s statement, this commentary seeks to reorient debates towards a more social inquiry into the structural impacts of the post-war socio-political arrangement. To do so comprehensively is a mighty task that the commentary does not seek to achieve, given the present format. Rather than a comprehensive analysis, it explores the dynamics of a key nexus in the post-war Lebanese social condition: difference and inequality. It aims to explain how social cleavages such as ethnicity, class, and gender can create a systematic bearing on inequality in Lebanese society.
Difference and Inequality
In his attempt to study the relationship between difference and inequality not as a ‘timeless truth’ but as ‘historically situated social processes’, Rogers Brubaker builds on Charles Tilly’s theory of categorical inequality, whereby internal organizational categories – namely those differentiated by factors such as wage, hierarchical authority, and benefits are matched with external categories such as class, ethnicity, religion, and gender. The process of matching between internal and external categories which leads to categorical inequality, according to Tilly, takes place through two mechanisms: exploitation, which “operates when powerful, connected people command resources from which they draw significantly increased returns by coordinating the effort of outsiders whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort”; and opportunity hoarding, which eludes to members of a “categorically bounded network” retaining for themselves exclusive access to resources of value, such as organizational positions, businesses and industries, and knowledge. Brubaker suggests that Tilly’s account shows how inequality can stem from difference, but does not clarify how different categories can generate inequality. In response, he introduces more general processes to address this ambiguity. Accordingly, there are three ways in which categorical differences could generate inequality: 1) the allocation of persons to reward-bearing positions; 2) the social production of unequally equipped categories of persons; and 3) the social definition of positions and their rewards.
Under the first process of allocation, categorical exclusion and potentially unequal representation would stem from gatekeeping processes at points of access to desirable social positions. This would take the form of formal exclusion of categories as is the case with marginalized communities in the court of law; exclusion that is informal but still primarily or entirely category-based visible in the religious segregation of neighborhoods; selection processes that are influenced by categories especially in corporate settings where quotas need to be met; and screening processes that appear neutral but rely on characteristics that favor certain categories and are relevant to the position as seen in the case differential inter-group professional skills and/or education.
Second, the social production of persons takes the form of the aggregate processes that generate “agents endowed with particular self-understandings, dispositions, aspirations, skills, experience, human or cultural capital, and ways of thinking and acting”. In this case, social processes that shape individuals’ habitus, namely their identities, aspirations, and commitments, do so in ways that steer different groups, such as women, men, and racial and ethnic communities, along distinct paths, that is, towards specific educational choices, career targets, or social networks. This variance could generate inequality over time, even if there aren’t any initial differences in skills or education. In addition, these processes could also directly generate inter-group inequalities in areas like skills, education, and other types of social capital.
Finally, in order to grasp a grounded picture of how the allocation and social production of persons generate inequality, Brubaker contends that it is crucial to consider how inequality manifests between categories of positions as a distinct process. He argues that positional inequality can stem from an inscribed inequality in the prevalent structure of positions, whereby the quality (or value) of the rewards (or services) on offer for differential positions is largely unequal. Similarly, incumbents’ categorical identities could have the same effect in specific geographical contexts, such as suburban neighborhoods, if the latter are taken as positions in the reward structure itself. This would potentially lead to the alteration of incumbents’ categorical identities to fit positional requirements.
The Consociational Façade
Much has been written on the post-war Lebanese political model since 1990. Therefore, this section will only briefly outline the conceptual and practical aspects of this model, with a particular emphasis on its structural impact. The Lebanese sectarian power-sharing model, known as consociational democracy, is based on the sharing of political resources – political representation, group autonomy, and decision-making power – between the various Lebanese cultural groups in order to achieve systemic stability in correspondence with the 1943 National Pact. Accordingly, a grand coalition arrangement is usually formed to reflect the cultural cleavages and political interests of a “cartel of elites” – in this case, sectarian – and ensure an equal sharing of power. Arend Liphart – the famous political scientist who originally developed the theory – contends that the consociational arrangement’s core characteristic in the case of Lebanon is the distribution of top power-holding seats at the level of the executive and legislative branches of government between the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites in order to avoid destabilizing political competition and hegemony by a single group.
While academic accounts have stressed how such a communitarian system has achieved systemic stability and safeguarded ethno-religious pluralism, the consensus arrangement has occasionally burst into conflict – as was the case in the 1958 and 1975 civil wars – and has, in the post-Taif era, been boiled down to a “self-perpetuating capture of state power” by the cartel of sectarian elites in the absence of true transitional justice and broad accountability. The post-Taif system, therefore, cannot be perceived as an authentic nation-building arrangement, but could be rather understood as a continuation of pre-war and wartime relational patterns.
In fact, Delatolla argues that the post-war practices of politicians are similar if not identical to those adopted during wartime. Consequently, conflict dynamics became entrenched in the Lebanese system due to the maintenance of “low-level” power-sharing tensions by the sectarian cartel of elites, their successful efforts at achieving subsistent political economies within their respective communities, and their ability to sustain these dynamics while also neutralizing civil mobilization. In this sense, the post-Taif system adheres to what Leenders described as the “allotment state”, a parallel arrangement to the Taif-National Pact correspondence in which the spoils of public offices, along with privileges and public resources, are partitioned.
To conclude this section, it is crucial to acknowledge the paradox inherent in the post-war consociational arrangement. Salloukh contends that while the consociational model has held post-war Lebanon together, state coherence, sound public administration, and efficient economic policy were the cost. This paradox could be further explained by the parallel coexistence of consistent struggles over institution-building with an evident refusal to apply bureaucratic norms. The result is a state of severe structural, categorical inequality of the kind we are concerned with in this commentary, where the selective exercise of bureaucratic rules is the norm, “turning Lebanon for some into a heaven for business and entrepreneurship and for others into a hell of suffocating state regulation”.
Categorical Inequality in Lebanon
In the preceding sections, Brubaker’s three-way framework explaining the production and maintenance of inequality by means of categorical distinction was presented. The sorting of persons into different positions, the social production of persons, and the social definition of rewards were adopted as general processes through which different categorizations could lead to inequality. The post-war Lebanese consociational model and its structural impacts were also briefly discussed. In what follows, Brubaker’s framework is employed to highlight scenarios showcasing how the system has entrenched categorical inequality according to the prevalent formal and informal realities in Lebanon.
First, beyond top positions, the mode of determination of access to public sector employment in Lebanon can be viewed as a standard case of informal exclusion based on the categorical allocation of persons to positions. Public sector employment opportunities such as municipal positions, ministerial appointments, and even employment at state-owned enterprises are, more often than not, reserved based on categorical identity and/or personal connections as opposed to merit. For example, Cammett showcases how the Wasta (accommodations based on connections) doctrine often favors less qualified candidates based on political affiliations, sectarian identities, or personal networks, especially in institutional settings. This is also the case, she argues, for “extra-state” political parties – parties that operate services in parallel to those of the state, often reserving services based on sectarian identity rather than opting for a non-discriminatory approach as is the case with “state-centric” political parties – parties that are more concerned with national elections than institutional control.
Second, when it comes to the social production of persons, regional disparities between geographical contexts in Lebanon are also quite standard. In the absence of a formal strategy of decentralization, marginalized areas such as Akkar in the north and Baalbeck-Hermel in the Beqaa valley are often left devoid of adequate services relative to more urban contexts. This, according to Dara, deepens spatial inequality in those areas. Similarly, research in the field of comparative education has showcased that pre-war educational inequalities based on religious identity have been largely maintained in the post-war era, especially in terms of Muslim-Christian educational divides. Such examples highlight how categorical distinctions based on regional and religious identities can deepen disparities in terms of habitus, namely skills, education, and resources necessary for upward mobility.
Finally, certain positions in Lebanon, whether in the public or private sectors, are elevated in value due to the composition of their reward structures. Of particular interest here is the state of rewards within the security apparatus before the October 2019 protests and the economic meltdown that ensued. For example, security apparatus positions such as those in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) offered significant benefits across all ranks according to testimonies, thus appealing to many rural and urban communities. Such benefits included housing allowances, personal budgets for equipment such as uniforms and attire, rank allowances, free healthcare and education for family members, among other benefits such as private chauffeurs in many cases. As a result of the economic crisis, however, the economic backbone of many of these positions dwindled, and with that, their social value, making them less desirable. Such positional reward structures play a significant role in shaping positional inequalities, and potentially, categorical inequalities as well.
Conclusion
This commentary has sought to highlight the ways in which categorical differences could potentially manifest instances of inequality in post-war Lebanon. It employed Brubaker’s three general processes to better understand this dynamic in the Lebanese case. Studies covering the post-war political arrangement have largely focused on the Lebanese power-sharing model, geopolitical influences, and the mismanagement of public resources. In focusing on a more sociological relationship in the nexus between difference and inequality in the Lebanese case, this commentary positions itself as an entry point into more socially grounded debates on the post-war socio-political arrangement, its loopholes, and the ways in which they can be remedied going forward.